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This paper documents the emergence of a regional financial cycle in Asia, evidenced by 
commonality in regional bank flows, and its impact on domestic credit. Using a dataset of 24,169 
non-financial Indian firms for the period 2001-2019, we establish that the regional financial cycle 
has a positive and significant impact on domestic corporate debt, as opposed to an insignificant 
effect on foreign currency corporate debt, after controlling for the global financial cycle. We find 
that both interbank markets and monetary policy conditions in the region act as transmission 
channels for this effect. We show that transparent firms which have lower monitoring costs are 
relatively more exposed to the regional financial cycle, suggesting that affiliates of foreign banks 
play an important role. However, the exposure of domestic credit markets reduces once regulators 
institute more stringent policy actions such as macroprudential policies, selective capital controls 
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Since the seminal work by Rey (2013), commonality in global financial conditions (also referred 
as the global financial cycle) has received considerable attention along with the special focus on 
US monetary policy in shaping it.1 The relevance of the global financial cycle differs across 
advanced economies and emerging markets (EMs) with a higher exposure of bank flows for 
advanced economies (Cerutti, Claessens and Rose, 2019; Aldasoro et al., 2020), while 
idiosyncratic factors are likely to drive bank flows in EMs. Consistently, there is evidence of 
commonality in financing conditions within EMs (Aldasoro et al., 2020) and within regions around 
the world (Adarov, 2020). Substantial transformations have characterized global credit dynamics 
over the last few decades, with the retrenchment of global banks, especially European ones, and 
the emergence of regional as well as emerging market lenders (Cerutti and Zhou, 2017; Cerutti, 
Koch and Pradhan, 2018; Bénétrix et al., 2019). Nonetheless, the emergence of regional financial 
cycles and their impact on domestic credit have been largely overlooked in the literature. We fill 
this gap in the literature and address this issue by focusing on Asia as there is compelling evidence 
of emergence of significant regional lenders. Indeed, banks from Japan and China have become 
the important drivers of regional lending in Asia (International Monetary Fund, 2015; Koch and 
Remolona, 2018). In this paper, we investigate whether these developments have led to the 
emergence of a regional financial cycle in Asia by focusing on the firm-level evidence from India. 
Differently from previous studies on financial cycles that focus on the exposure of bank flows, to 
the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper studying the impact of regional financial cycle on 
domestic credit markets. 
Employing a detailed firm-level dataset of 24,169 non-financial Indian firms for the period 
2001-2019, we analyze whether domestic credit markets are affected by the regional financial 
cycle, after controlling for the global financial cycle. India provides a representative case for the 
analysis of regional lending in Asia for two main reasons. First, there are several similarities in the 
structure of the Indian economy with other economies in the region – such as the degree of 
underdevelopment of corporate bond and foreign exchange (FX) hedging markets, the presence of 
domestic credit market frictions and the dual structure of formal-informal finance (Allen et al., 
2012; Banerjee and Mohanty, 2021). Cross-border bank flows to the countries in the region exhibit 
 
1 The literature on capital flows and global factors is vast starting from the work on push and pull factors by Calvo, 
Leiderman and Reinhart (1993, 1996). See Koepke (2019) for a recent review of the literature. 
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significant commonality, as documented by the cross-country correlation analysis provided in 
Table 1. Second, India is one of the largest and fastest growing economies in the world,2 with 
important global and regional economic linkages. Its interconnection to global markets was 
reflected by the particularly large capital outflows and currency depreciation during the 2013 taper 
tantrum episode (Azis and Shin, 2015; Banti and Bose, 2021). As such, India provides a 
comprehensive case to study rising FX risk exposures especially in the aftermath of Global 
Financial Crisis (GFC), and cross-border monetary transmissions via regional and global financial 
channels for other economies in the region. Furthermore, this study is also relevant for other EMs 
as several studies have documented the risks related to global factors and foreign debt issuances 
for emerging market corporate borrowers (Chung et al., 2015; McCauley, McGuire and Sushko, 
2015; Alter and Elekdag, 2020; Bräuning and Ivashina, 2020). However, in our paper, we compare 
and contrast the role of regional and global financial cycles on domestic and foreign corporate 
borrowings as we believe that differentiating between domestic and foreign borrowings is crucial 
to disentangle the exposure of credit markets to external factors. Indeed, we find that the regional 
financial cycle only influences domestic corporate debt, whereas foreign corporate debt is only 
affected by the global financial cycle. These findings indicate the presence of different channels 
through which external factors related to the regional and global financial cycles operate. The 
identification of these channels is essential to devise appropriate and effective policy frameworks 
to manage countries’ exposure to these factors.  
Interbank markets are likely to play a key role in the exposure of domestic credit markets 
to both global and regional factors.3 Focusing on global credit shocks, Cetorelli and Goldberg 
(2011) identify interbank markets as the main source of transmission of global shocks to EMs 
during the GFC, which is also confirmed by Avdjiev, McGuire and von Peter (2020). Focusing on 
the drivers of bank deleveraging during the GFC, Cerutti and Claessens (2017) document 
significant differences between international lending via affiliates and direct cross-border bank 
lending. The literature proposes two main channels for the transmission of monetary policy across 
borders through bank lending, focusing specifically on the role of US monetary policy. Although 
these channels are generally related to global banks, our main empirical findings suggest that 
 
2 India is the sixth largest economy in the world by GDP (current US dollars in 2020, World Bank). 
3 Although bond issuances have become more important in the post-GFC period, Asian firms mostly rely on bank 
loans as opposed to bond financing for their external financing (Duffee and Hördahl, 2021). 
4 
 
regional banks are equally important and able in transmitting these effects.4 On one hand, the “bank 
lending” channel emphasizes the role of leverage in global banks such that a US monetary policy 
contraction leads to global bank deleveraging and reducing the global supply of credit (Miranda-
Agrippino and Rey, 2020). Bruno and Shin (2015) present a related “risk-taking” channel of 
currency appreciation. They show that a strong dollar, together with the corresponding 
depreciation of the domestic currency, worsen the balance sheet of domestic borrowers and their 
credit risk profile, in turn constraining banks’ lending capacity and credit provision.5 On the other 
hand, the “international portfolio rebalancing” channel focuses on the relocation towards safer 
borrowers abroad triggered by the decline in net worth and collateral value of US domestic 
borrowers following a monetary policy tightening in the US (Correa et al., 2021). Moreover, as 
higher interest rates in the US reflect benign economic conditions in advanced economies, they 
may result in higher confidence of international lenders and a “search for yield” behavior that 
increases credit supply globally. Avdjiev and Hale (2019) establish that the channel which 
dominates the dynamics of bank flows is determined by the risk tolerance regime. Moreover, Buch 
et al. (2019) show that different countries exhibit different channels at work at the same time.  
Aside from bank lending, external factors can also affect corporate borrowings via the 
domestic monetary policy responses. To reduce pressure on the exchange rate, central banks may 
alter domestic interest rates and cost of financing for corporations, in turn. This may lead to 
increasing bond issuances by corporations domestically or abroad. In this respect, easing financing 
conditions in global markets, may trigger portfolio rebalancing by asset managers in search for 
yields towards high-yield issuances by emerging market corporations (Avdjiev, Chui and Shin, 
2014; McCauley, McGuire and Sushko, 2015; Caballero, Panizza and Powell, 2016; Lo Duca, 
Nicoletti and Vidal Martínez, 2016). Further, as Asia is characterized by strong regional economic 
integration and strong trade linkages (Hirata, Kose and Otrok, 2013), the economic performance 
of the major countries in the region may also influence corporate borrowings via the demand for 
exports. 
 
4 In this paper, we refer to regional banks as the banks that are headquartered in the geographical Asian region (Cerutti 
and Zhou, 2017) 
5 Banerjee and Mohanty (2021) empirically document this effect for Indian firms, while Avdjiev and Takáts (2019) 
study the role of currency networks in international transmission of monetary policy spillovers. 
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This paper adds three main contributions to the existing literature. First, we document the 
existence of a regional financial cycle in Asia that is relevant for domestic credit markets and is 
driven by funding conditions in interbank markets and monetary policy in regional lender 
countries. Although the literature has generally documented limited regional financial integration 
contrasted with strong global linkages (Eichengreen and Park, 2005; Kim, Lee and Shin, 2008; 
Park and Shin, 2009), the emergence of a regional financial cycle reveals growing financial 
integration in Asia (Bouvatier and Delatte, 2015).6  
The literature on capital flows has focused mainly on global dynamics, the global financial 
cycle and global liquidity, and generally documented a significant impact of global factors on 
firms’ foreign borrowings and leverage (Chung et al., 2015; McCauley, McGuire and Sushko, 
2015; Arregui et al., 2018; Alter and Elekdag, 2020; Bräuning and Ivashina, 2020), but the regional 
dynamics have received far less attention. We contribute to this literature by identifying different 
transmission channels for regional and global factors. Our main finding of the relevance of regional 
financial cycle for domestic corporate debt exclusively indicates that the exposure to the regional 
financial cycle may originate from lending activity of affiliates of regional banks and/or domestic 
banks that obtain wholesale funding regionally. In addition, our finding of the global financial 
cycle affecting corporate FX borrowings indicates that this effect is likely to be transmitted via the 
lending activity and portfolio allocations of global banks and global investors. These results have 
important policy implications. The exposure to the regional financial cycle provides diversification 
to countries’ reliance on global banks in favor of regional and domestic actors. From a financial 
stability perspective, this growing exposure may contain countries’ exposure to global factors 
mainly originating in the US. Given the currency component, FX risk is not likely to arise from 
the exposure to regional factors. Among the drivers of the global financial cycle, only uncertainty 
in the US monetary policy affects both domestic and foreign corporate debt strongly. This is indeed 
consistent with the dramatic impact of the 2013 taper tantrum episode on EMs when capital inflows 
stopped suddenly, but it also points towards a potential wider impact beyond FX (mainly USD) 
 
6 Countries in the region have adopted various initiatives to foster regional financial integration including the Chiang 
Mai multilateral currency swap initiative and the Asian Bond Markets Initiative (ABMI). Importantly, regional 
multilateral cooperation extends to knowledge and information exchange about capital flows within the SEACEN 
centre that is a regional research and learning hub for central banks in the Asia-Pacific region. 
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denominated debt to domestic debt.7 Moreover, we show that when regional monetary policy 
diverges from monetary policy in the US, the impact of the regional financial cycle grows stronger.  
The literature has also documented the growing importance of Japanese and Chinese banks 
as key lenders in the region after the GFC (International Monetary Fund, 2015; Koch and 
Remolona, 2018). Turning to the sources of cross-border bank credit, we show that Japanese 
financing conditions play a leading role in the dynamics of the regional financial cycle, while the 
relevance of Chinese factors is still relatively limited but emerging. Importantly, as opposed to the 
global financial cycle that is US-centric, the regional financial cycle appears to stem from 
financing conditions in a group of key lenders. Although Japanese factors exert the strongest 
impact, financial conditions in other lender countries, such as Australia and Singapore, have a 
significant impact on domestic credit too.  
Our second contribution relates to the literature investigating whether domestic and 
international financial markets are substitutes or complements and argues that financial frictions 
can lead to market segmentation, preventing some firms and investors to participate in 
international financial markets. For instance, information asymmetries, transaction costs, and 
regulation can inhibit some firms from using certain markets and/or result in certain investors and 
financial intermediaries dominating specific markets (Bekaert et al., 2011; Abraham, Cortina and 
Schmukler, 2021). Thus, even in an increasingly globalized world in which financial transactions 
can take place anywhere, domestic intermediaries still play a meaningful role for emerging 
economy firms. The literature on the role of foreign banks in domestic credit markets documents 
that foreign banks tend to lend more to local borrowers that require less soft information due to 
relatively stronger information asymmetries (Mian, 2006; Berger et al., 2008; Gormley, 2010). 
This also has implications on the transmission of monetary policy. Focusing on firm and bank-
level data for Mexico, Morais et al., (2019) document that foreign monetary policy affects lending 
via the respective foreign banks, that is, US, EU, and UK banks transmit US, EU and UK monetary 
policy shocks, respectively. Our results show that transparent firms with lower monitoring costs 
are more exposed to the regional financial cycle in the domestic credit markets. Building on the 
 
7 In May 2013, Bernanke’s speech on future tapering of the US quantitative easing policy triggered episodes of capital 
inflow reversals (Bank for International Settlements, 2013). This episode marked the beginning of a period of intense 




literature on foreign bank lending behavior, this result suggests that regional banks may act as a 
transmission channel for the exposure of the domestic credit market to the regional financial cycle 
via their local affiliates, mainly branches in the case of India.  
The third contribution of the paper highlights that while the literature has studied the 
effectiveness of countries’ policy responses to shifts in global financing conditions, little is known 
about their effectiveness to tackle countries’ exposure to regional factors. Given the differences 
that we find in the exposure of domestic credit markets to regional and global financial cycles, we 
explore whether specific measures are suitable to mitigate exposure to regional factors. Starting in 
the aftermath of the GFC, a strand of the literature has documented that macroprudential policies 
(MPs) provide some respite from global liquidity (Habermeier, Kokenyne and Baba, 2011; Ostry 
et al., 2012; Bruno, Shim and Shin, 2017; Banti and Phylaktis, 2019). Moreover, the large swings 
in capital flows associated with the global financial cycle may have weakened the effectiveness of 
currency regimes for monetary policy autonomy (Rey, 2013; Dées and Galesi, 2021). Taking a 
more nuanced stance, Obstfeld (2015) argues that countries that employ a flexible exchange rate 
regime can rely on independent monetary policy to a certain extent. Studying the synchronization 
of domestic financial cycles in a set of advanced economies, Jordà et al., (2019) document that the 
exposure to a global financial cycle is more muted, although still sizable, in floating as opposed to 
fixed currency regimes. Finally, there is also mixed evidence in the literature about the 
effectiveness of capital account controls to reduce the impact of capital flows towards EMs 
(Forbes, Fratzscher and Straub, 2015; Bhattarai, Chatterjee and Park, 2020). We contribute to this 
literature by documenting a relatively stronger effectiveness of these policy tools to tackle regional 
financial cycles. In particular, we show that MPs do mitigate the exposure of domestic credit 
markets to liquidity shifts that originate regionally. This is especially interesting given the main 
use of bank-based MPs in India as opposed to FX-based MPs that appears to be appropriate given 
the domestic currency dimension of the exposure to the regional financial cycle that we document. 
We also provide some support to the more nuanced view on currency regime effectiveness and 
show how targeted capital account controls and a floating currency can reduce the exposure of 
domestic credit markets to the regional financial cycle. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature. We 
report data and summary statistics in section 3. Section 4 presents the empirical analysis and 
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section 5 provides additional tests based on other regional lenders and monetary policies. Finally, 
section 6 concludes the paper.  
2. Background literature  
We place our study in the context of the literature on global financial cycle including its relevance 
for EMs and international financial integration, and the policy responses to tackle these evolving 
global conditions.  
2.1 Global financial cycle 
In her seminal work, Rey (2013) argues that there is a common component, termed as the global 
financial cycle, in asset prices, capital flows and credit growth around the world, which originates 
in the US and captures risk aversion in global markets. Since then, few papers have investigated 
the dynamics and relevance of the global financial cycle for different countries around the world. 
Amiti, McGuire and Weinstein (2019) find that the explanatory power of the global financial cycle 
for bank flows is time-varying and it has become weaker in the post-GFC period. Arregui et al. 
(2018) also find that although the global financial cycle is relevant, its importance has not changed 
over time. Further, Di Giovanni et al. (2019) show that over 40% of domestic credit cyclical 
growth in Turkey can be explained by the global financial cycle, as measured by the VIX. Focusing 
on unexpected shifts to the VIX, Bhattarai, Chatterjee and Park (2020) document that several EMs 
financial variables, including the exchange rate and capital inflows, are negatively affected by a 
shock to US uncertainty. For India, Prabheesh, Anglingkusumo and Juhro (2021) show that the 
domestic credit cycle is affected by the global financial cycle through domestic currency dynamics. 
The presence of a global financial cycle driving capital flows around the world is especially 
relevant for EMs that are left to tackle the effect of global liquidity on their own. Relying on a set 
of measures and estimations of the global financial cycle, Cerutti, Claessens and Rose (2019) 
document the relatively lower power of the global financial cycle to explain capital flows but 
highlights its importance for the credit markets. Aldasoro et al. (2020) show that the global 
financial cycle explains larger variations of capital flows to advanced economies than to EMs. 
However, they find that the explanatory power of an “emerging market” financial cycle is higher 
for EMs than the global financial cycle. Moreover, Adarov (2020) documents significant 
synchronization of domestic financial cycles at regional level. 
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2.2 Policy responses to global shocks 
There is a large literature on the effectiveness of various policy responses to manage the impact of 
global financing conditions on capital flows and domestic markets. Countries can insulate their 
economies from external shocks via capital controls or macroprudential policies (MPs). MPs 
comprise of prudential measures other than monetary policy designed at safeguarding and 
promoting financial stability at both institutional and systemic level (International Monetary Fund, 
2017). These measures have attracted renewed interest from policymakers and academia in 
advanced economies especially in the aftermath of the GFC, although they were already in use 
across several EMs (Galati and Moessner, 2013). Under the MPs umbrella, we can find a wide 
range of measures. There are measures that are directly targeted at the banking sector, as it is the 
case for capital requirements; other measures target borrowers directly, for instance with limits to 
the loan-to-value ratio; finally, some measures are currency-based or FX tools, in the form for 
example of limitations to FX loans by banks.  
Evidence shows that MPs are generally effective at reducing domestic credit growth (Lim 
et al., 2011; Ostry et al., 2012; Cerutti, Claessens and Laeven, 2017). Given the destabilizing effect 
that capital flows can have during episodes of turmoil, a strand of the literature has investigated 
whether and to what extent MPs mitigate countries’ exposure to capital flows. Banti and Phylaktis 
(2019) find that selected MP tools reduce the impact of global liquidity shocks on house prices. 
Eller et al. (2021) document a significant effect, as MP tightening reduces domestic credit growth 
and capital flows and their volatility, especially when adopted in a low-interest rate environment. 
Concentrating on Asia-Pacific countries, Bruno, Shim and Shin (2017) report that MPs effectively 
manage bank flows. Frost, Ito and van Stralen (2020) find that MPs reduce capital inflows in a 
large set of 83 countries. Exploring a loan-level dataset for Romania, Epure et al. (2018) document 
a similarly positive effect of MPs on domestic credit dynamics especially when global financial 
conditions are permissive. While they support the general findings, Beirne and Friedrich (2017) 
show that MPs effectiveness depends on the banking structure. Regulations are more effective at 
managing capital flows in systems with higher quality and sounder banking systems. Further, some 
authors find that FX-based MPs are effective at tackling FX bank lending (Lim et al., 2011; Ostry 
et al., 2012). Ahnert et al. (2021) show that banks’ exposure to the global financial cycle is 
effectively reduced by FX-based MP actions, although the exposure appears to shift to other 
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sectors of the financial system. Finally, there is evidence of circumvention and regulatory 
arbitrage, mostly via local affiliates of foreign banks (Cerutti and Zhou, 2018). 
Capital controls are designed to reduce capital flows. Restrictions to the capital account 
can be targeted at specific types of flows, such as portfolio flows, other (mainly banking) flows, 
etc. The evidence on the effectiveness of capital controls to manage capital flows is mixed. While 
MP measures targeting capital flows are generally effective, Frost, Ito and van Stralen (2020) do 
not find any evidence of capital controls reducing or changing the composition of capital flows. 
Similarly, Forbes, Fratzscher and Straub (2015) show that capital flow management tools are not 
generally successful. Bhattarai, Chatterjee and Park (2020) find evidence that countries’ exposure 
to global shocks differ depending on their monetary policy responses, as well as attitude towards 
capital flows as reflected in capital controls. Interestingly, conducting a textual analysis of Central 
Bank policy minutes, they note that Asian countries, including India, are particularly attentive to 
capital flows dynamics and thus their policy actions are more responsive to global shocks than 
countries in other regions, such as Latin America.  
Studying the international trilemma, Rey (2013) argues that the presence of a global 
financial cycle leaves countries unable to pursue independent monetary policy irrespective of their 
currency regimes, as long as their capital accounts are open. She argues for a dilemma as opposed 
to the standard trilemma in international macroeconomics. Identifying the US monetary policy as 
key driver of the global financial cycle, Dées and Galesi (2021) find that the complex interactions 
in international financial markets amplify the exposure of countries to this factor. In line with Rey 
(2013), they find a weak role of currency regimes to shield countries from the global financial 
cycle. Taking a more nuanced stance, Obstfeld (2015) argues that countries that employ a flexible 
exchange rate regime can rely on independent monetary policy to a certain extent, at least to 
influence the short end of the term structure of the interest rates. He agrees that the long-term 
interest rates are largely driven by a global common factor irrespective of the currency regime. 
More recently, Dées and Galesi (2021) show that countries’ exposure to the global financial cycle 
increases as they become more globally integrated. Integration in global financial markets makes 
countries more exposed to not only financial spillovers from advanced countries, but also from 
EMs (International Monetary Fund, 2016).  
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2.3 Financial integration in regional and global markets 
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2018) show that international financial integration for EMs is relatively 
low (13%) if compared with their share of world output (40%). Focusing on international banking 
integration post-GFC, Bouvatier and Delatte (2015) document declining international presence of 
Euro area banks, but an increasing integration from non-Euro area banks. Greater banking 
integration is mostly associated with common language, higher financial openness (Chinn-Ito 
index) and physical proximity. Similarly, Eichengreen and Park (2005) show that international 
banking linkages are associated with physical distance and common language, but not with a 
common border indicating importance of information costs as opposed to transportation costs (that 
is more relevant for trade linkages). Kubelec and Sá (2012) build a unique dataset of bilateral 
holdings for 18 countries for the period 1980-2005 and show using a gravity model that proximity 
and other proxies of information asymmetry explain bilateral asset stocks and flows similar to 
trade flows. Moreover, creditors systematically lend more to countries with closer trade links. 
Thus, the evidence on the importance of similarity and proximity suggests an important role of 
regional financial integration as opposed to global linkages. 
 Park and Shin (2009) note that regional financial integration in East Asia has not expanded 
at the same pace as regional economic integration. East Asian countries have integrated financially 
in the global system with primarily the US and EU, but financial integration within the region has 
grown slowly (as measured by co-movement in stock prices with data up to 2006). This is also 
confirmed by Eichengreen and Park (2005) and Kim, Lee and Shin (2008) who document lower 
integration in Asia than in the Europe. Focusing on equity markets over the period of 2006 to 2013, 
Raddant and Kenett (2021) show that Asian equity markets are relatively segmented from global 
equity markets, and present some regional linkages. Looking at different asset classes may provide 
different answers, as McCauley, Fung and Gadanecz (2002) find that regional banks and investors 
are generally holders of Asian bonds and syndicated loans in the region resulting in higher financial 
integration over time. Importantly, Kubelec and Sá (2012) show that differently from trade flows 
that give rise to intra-continental clusters, financial linkages are dominated by few key hubs 




Turning to an investigation of time-variation in financial integration, Yu, Fung and Tam (2010) 
document increasing integration in equity markets in the region with a variety of indicators in the 
period leading to the GFC (that is the end of their sample). Fry-McKibbin, Hsiao and Martin (2018) 
show that financial integration of stock markets with the US and China has generally increased 
over time, with declines during the GFC and in the latter period of their sample until 2016. They 
find that financial integration has deteriorated to post-Asian crisis levels from 2014-2016 and key 
determinants of the level of regional integration are the developments in the Chinese economy.  
3. Data and summary statistics 
3.1 Firm-level dataset 
We employ a dataset covering profit and loss and balance sheet data assembled by Centre for 
Monitoring Indian Economy (CMIE) in their Prowess database. The Prowess database covers over 
40,000 Indian companies comprising of different sizes, ownership groups, and operating in a wide 
variety of sectors, such as manufacturing, utilities, resources, and services.8 Following normal 
selection criteria, observations in the 1% from upper and lower tails of the distribution of the firm-
level financial variables are winsorised to control for outliers. Finally, the panel has an unbalanced 
structure of 24,169 non-financial Indian firms for the period of 2001-2019.  
In our analysis, the main dependent variables are firms’ domestic debt ratio and FX debt 
ratio calculated as the ratio of domestic bank borrowings over total debt and proceeds from foreign 
currency borrowings (in INR million) over total debt, respectively.9 Moreover, we include several 
firm-level controls in line with Banti and Bose (2021) such as firm size, measured as log real total 
assets. Firms that are larger in size are able to cope well with financial constraints and have greater 
access to external finance (Bose, Mallick, and Tsoukas, 2020; Bose, MacDonald, and Tsoukas, 
2019). Hence, we expect size to be positively associated with access to domestic and foreign 
currency borrowings. Liquidity is measured by the quick ratio calculated as the ratio of quick assets 
 
8 See www.cmie.com for more information on the Prowess database, which has been widely used in several studies 
such as Gormley (2010), Allen et al. (2012), Acharya and Vij (2020) and Banti and Bose (2021). 
9 Domestic borrowing from banks captures the outstanding value of funds raised by a company through banks, which 
may be secured or unsecured. Foreign currency borrowing (reported in in INR million) is defined in the Prowess 
database as any loan taken by the company in a currency other than in Indian rupees. Examples of such loans are 
commercial bank loans, Floating Rate Notes, etc. They also include credit from official export credit agencies and 
commercial borrowing from the private sector window of multilateral financial institutions such as IBRD, World Bank 
and Asian Development Bank. Suppliers’ credit is not included here. 
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to quick liabilities. Higher liquidity might encourage firms to have higher debt ratios due to 
increased ability to meet short-term obligations (Ozkan, 2001), implying a positive relationship 
between liquidity and external finance. Tangibility is defined as the ratio of net fixed assets to total 
real assets. Firms with higher tangibility have higher ability to borrow from external financial 
markets. Finally, export firm is a dummy that takes the value of one if a firm has positive export 
sales, and zero otherwise. Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Maksimovic (2008) highlight that exporting 
firms use more external finance compared to non-exporting firms. We expect a positive 
relationship between firms’ borrowings and their liquidity, tangibility and exporting status. 
3.2 Regional variables 
Given our focus on the dynamics of domestic credit markets, we estimate the regional financial 
cycle in Asia by focusing on the commonality of cross-border bank flows to the region (Cerutti, 
Claessens and Rose, 2019). Our regional sample includes China, Hong Kong SAR, India, 
Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand, and Vietnam. We obtain 
the series of cross-border claims for all reporting banks to all sectors from the Bank for 
International Settlements (BIS) Consolidated Banking Statistics, and then take the first differences 
to measure bank flows.  
As regional drivers of bank flows commonality, we focus on a series of supply-side factors 
originating from the main lenders in the region. In line with Koch and Remolona (2018), we 
consider the following countries as key lenders- Australia, Hong Kong SAR, Japan, Korea, 
Taiwan, and Singapore. Due to the limited literature on regional factors, we adopt the literature on 
global factors to identify the corresponding regional measures for the key lenders that helps us to 
control for the supply-side factors. We then average the measures among the lender countries to 
build the series of regional factors. Moreover, to capture the relative contribution of individual 
lender countries on the regional linkages, we also consider the largest lenders individually such as 
Japan, Australia and Singapore. We consider the Japanese measures separately, since Japan is the 
largest single lender to India in the region. We focus on Australia as it is the second largest lender 
to India according to the BIS data. Further, Raddant and Kenett (2021) analyze co-movement in 
equity prices around the world and find a strong linkage between India and Singapore. Hence, we 
also include Singapore separately. Finally, given the strong evidence of increasing cross-border 
bank flows from China in the region (International Monetary Fund, 2015), we consider the special 
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case of China in a separate section. In all the specifications, we control for global factors by 
employing the corresponding US-based measures. 
Given our focus on the cross-border bank flows, we follow the empirical literature and 
employ interbank rate as a measure of funding constraints in the regional banking sectors (Cerutti, 
Claessens and Ratnovski, 2017; Banti and Phylaktis, 2019). We obtain the money market interbank 
rates for the key lenders from the OECD database. We expect corporate borrowings to decline 
when interbank rates increase as tighter funding costs in interbank markets lead to a contraction in 
the domestic supply of credit. Next, in order to assess the role of regional monetary policy, we 
employ the yield spreads and policy rates of lender countries. The yield spread is the difference 
between the 10-year and the 2-year government bond yields, and it measures the steepness of the 
yield curve. As banks borrow short-term to lend in the long-term, banks engage in “search for 
yield” when the yield curve flattens (Turner, 2014; Cerutti, Claessens and Ratnovski, 2017). We 
obtain the yield spreads from DataStream. Given their impact on banks profitability and funding 
costs, we expect the yield spread to be negatively related to corporate borrowings. Moreover, we 
take the official policy rates of the main lenders in the region as indicator for the regional monetary 
policy stance (Cerutti, Claessens and Ratnovski, 2017), and this data is obtained from the IMF’s 
International Financial Statistics (IFS) database. We expect the policy rate to be negatively related 
to corporate borrowings. 
Finally, uncertainty in the US monetary policy triggered large capital flows from EMs 
during the taper tantrum episode of May 2013 (Bank for International Settlements, 2013). Hence, 
to account for this factor, we employ a proxy of monetary policy uncertainty in Japan, controlling 
for uncertainty in the US. We expect corporate borrowings to decline with greater uncertainty. We 
measure Japanese monetary policy uncertainty with the indicator developed by Arbatli et al. 
(2019) based on the methodology in Baker, Bloom and Davis (2016). The US monetary policy 
uncertainty measure is from Baker, Bloom and Davis (2016).10 The taper tantrum episode also 
marked the divergence of monetary policy between the US and other advanced economies altering 
the sensitivities of bank flows and corporate debt to global liquidity (Avdjiev et al., 2020; Banti 
and Bose, 2021). Following Avdjiev et al. (2020), we measure the monetary policy divergence 
 
10 These measures are constructed from textual analysis of major newspapers in the relative country to identify the 
frequency of the use of selected key terms in the text of the articles and are available at www.PolicyUncertainty.com. 
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between the main lender Japan and the US with the difference between the 3-month Euro-dollar 
and Euro-Yen futures.  
3.3 Policy measures to manage the regional financial cycle 
Borrowing from the literature on countries’ exposure to global liquidity and capital flows, we focus 
on a series of measures that countries can adopt to shield their economies from regional shocks. 
The effectiveness of these measures depends on their ability to influence the transmission channels 
of the regional financial cycle in domestic credit markets.  
If the source of the shocks is external to the domestic financial system, then the imposition 
of capital controls or FX-based MPs can help to manage the exposure of domestic credit markets. 
While capital controls are targeted specifically at foreign investors, FX-based MPs target the FX 
operations of domestic banks. Hence, these measures potentially restrict domestic banks’ 
borrowings as well as their lending activity in FX. While the latter would not be directly related to 
domestic corporate debt, the former is directly related to the exposure of domestic banks to the 
regional financial cycle via the interbank market. Aimed at strengthening the domestic banking 
sector and curbing domestic credit growth, non-FX MPs can also help in mitigating the exposure 
of domestic credit markets to regional shocks. For instance, limiting domestic bank lending activity 
and borrowers’ access to credit, MPs can curb the exposure of corporate borrowings by reducing 
it directly or indirectly. Making the domestic banking sector more resilient also helps to reduce 
their exposure to external sources of funding. However, these policy actions could have unintended 
consequences. Imposing limits on domestic banks’ lending activity can encourage affiliates of 
foreign banks to step in (Cerutti and Zhou, 2018). Hence, MPs can shift the source of the 
transmission channel to different actors in the banking sector rather than manage the exposure of 
domestic credit (Ahnert et al., 2021). Following the literature, we expect the impact of the regional 
financial cycle on domestic credit markets to decline with MPs. We employ the aggregated 
macroprudential policy (MP) measure from the IMF’s integrated Macroprudential Policy (iMaPP) 
database, originally constructed by Alam et al. (2019) up to 2018. We take the sum of all policy 
actions in a year, measured as +1 for each tightening and -1 for each loosening policy action. 
Hence, the indicator measures the strength of the MP stance in each year. Looking at the 
disaggregated data, the most common actions adopted in India are bank reserve requirements and 
capital requirements. There is little evidence of the use of FX-based MP, with the exception of 
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four policy actions in 18 years on limits to open FX positions, exposure and funding, including 
limits on FX mismatches. Hence, we expect the role of FX-based MP measures to be limited in 
the context of our study.  
In addition to MPs, we consider capital account controls. The common indicators adopted 
in the literature such as the Ito-Chinn index and the Fernández et al. (2015) index do not vary over-
time for our sample on India. Hence, we employ the degree of sectoral openness in the economy 
by identifying the sectors that are precluded or restricted to foreign investors. We use the 
information provided by the World Bank on the ease of starting a foreign investment in various 
sectors. The sectors with higher restrictions for foreign investments in India include agriculture 
and forestry, media, telecommunication, and transportation. If capital controls are effective, we 
expect the impact of the regional financial cycle to be stronger for less restricted sectors of the 
economy.  
Finally, countries may rely on their currency regime to shield domestic monetary policy 
from external shocks, allowing their currency to freely float (Jordà et al., 2019). However, Rey 
(2013) questions whether countries’ growing exposure to the global financial cycle has reduced 
the ability of currency regime to effectively mitigate these exposures to global shocks. We consider 
the impact of FX policy by classifying periods of FX interventions in the Indian rupee according 
to the methodology developed by Shambaugh (2004). Using FX market data from Datastream, we 
construct a measure of exchange rate regime by considering the currency pegged in a particular 
year if the exchange rate of the Indian rupee versus the US dollar has fluctuated in a tight band of 
+/-2% in that year. As evidence of an effective currency regime, we expect a weaker impact of the 
regional financial cycle when the currency regime is freely floating.  
3.4 Other macro controls 
In our specifications we control for domestic determinants of bank credit. In particular, we include 
the domestic real GDP growth to measure the economic performance of the Indian economy.11 We 
collect this data from the IMF WEO. We consider the stock returns as an indicator for asset market 
performance. We measure stock returns as the annual log return of the stock market index and this 
data comes from DataStream. Finally, we control for the Indian interbank rate to isolate the impact 
 
11 Our results hold when we employ the HP filtered GDP as an alternative measure for the domestic business cycle.   
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of regional and global factors on domestic borrowings aside from the impact on the domestic bank 
funding conditions. We collect this information from the OECD database. Overall, we expect 
corporate borrowings to increase with the real GDP growth and the stock market returns, and to 
decline with interbank rates.  
3.5 Summary statistics 
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics for all the variables used in our analysis. We report mean, 
median and standard deviations for the whole sample in columns 1-3, respectively. Looking at the 
firm-level debt variables, we find that the proportion of domestic bank debt in total debt is much 
higher than the proportion of foreign debt. The median domestic bank debt to total debt is 0.72, 
while the ratio of foreign currency to total debt is 0.29 for the median firm-year. There is a wide 
variance in the foreign currency ratio with the standard deviation of 0.33, very close to the median, 
also observed by Acharya and Vij (2020). 
Turning to the regional and global factors, interbank rates in the region are higher than in 
the US on average, indicating more stringent funding conditions in the region. Looking at the 
individual countries in the region, we see that interbank rates are especially higher in Australia but 
lower in both Japan and Singapore, than the average level in the US. Yield spreads are generally 
positive in both Asian countries and in the US, as expected. However, average yield spreads are 
far greater in the region than in the US, indicating steeper yield curves in the Asian countries. The 
yield curve is especially steep in Australia and Singapore, but almost flat in Japan. Moreover, 
regional policy rates are generally higher than the US Fed Funds rate, although the US Fed Funds 
rates vary more. Policy rates are especially higher in Australia, but relatively lower in Japan and 
Singapore. Looking at Indian MPs, we see that Indian authorities have adopted an annual average 
of 1.66 policy actions. There is evidence of capital controls implemented in India, with an average 
share of foreign ownerships across the sectors of the Indian economy restricted to 89.56%. Finally, 
while the Indian rupee is generally freely floating, there is evidence of periods of FX management, 
as the average value of the exchange rate regime measure is 0.40, closer to 0 (floating currency) 
as opposed to 1 (pegged currency). 
As preliminary evidence of co-movement in bank flows in the region, we conduct a pair-
wise correlation analysis. Specifically, we calculate the bank flows correlation of each country vis-
a-vis the other countries individually and then we report the average correlation coefficients in 
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Table 2. We find preliminary evidence of significant commonality in capital flows in the region, 
with correlation coefficients greater than 30% in all countries except Philippines with lower 
average correlation of 19%. These correlations only capture the contemporaneous co-movement 
of financial cycles, hence in the empirical analysis below we employ a dynamic factor model to 
explore the developments of these co-movements.  
4. Empirical model and findings 
4.1 Regional financial cycle in Asia 
In the spirit of Cerutti, Claessens and Rose (2019) and Miranda-Agrippino and Rey (2020), we 
build a measure of regional financial cycle by estimating a dynamic factor model and extracting a 
common factor from bank flows to the countries in the region. This sample includes China, Hong 
Kong SAR, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand, and 
Vietnam. This regional financial cycle captures the commonality of the financing conditions in 
the countries. We follow the methodology in Miranda-Agrippino and Rey (2020) and model the 
series of bank flows as function of a common factor to capture the systematic variation and an 
idiosyncratic factor that is country-specific. We model the common factor to follow an AR(1) 
process.12 In addition, we build a measure for the global financial cycle by estimating a dynamic 
factor model of the bank flows to all countries whose data is available in the BIS Consolidated 
Banking Statistics database. This global sample comprises of 158 countries. 
Next, we plot the regional financial cycle together with the global financial cycle in Figure 
1. The regional financial cycle exhibits strong variations as compared to global financial cycle 
with larger downswings especially during the episodes of market turbulence such as the GFC in 
2008-2009 and the economic slowdown in China during 2015 and 2018. Although the dynamics 
between the regional and global financial cycles appear quite similar, the regional cycle is 
characterized by deeper cyclical upswings and downswings. We find that the correlation between 
the two series is around 64%. Contrasting to most studies in the literature on the global financial 
cycle (Cerutti, Claessens and Rose, 2019; Adarov, 2020; Aldasoro et al., 2020), we are not 
interested in the explanatory power of the regional cycle on capital flows per se, but instead aim 
 
12 We estimate our model by maximum likelihood with the Berndt–Hall–Hall–Hausman (BHHH) technique.  
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to determine the relevance of the regional financial cycle for credit markets in the Asian region, 
and whether countries are able to manage this exposure using different macroeconomic policies. 
4.2 Regional financial cycle and domestic credit markets  
In this section, we estimate the impact of the regional financial cycle on corporate debt in India. 
Given that bank flow commonality in the region may also arise from countries’ common exposure 
to the global financial cycle, we control for the global financial cycle in our specifications and 
estimate the following models: 
𝐷𝑜 𝑖  𝑇𝑜  𝑖 = + 𝑅 𝑦 − + 𝑦 − +  𝑖 − + − + 𝑓𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,               (1) 
𝐹𝑋 𝑇𝑜  𝑖 = + 𝑅 𝑦 − + 𝑦 − + 𝑖 − + − + 𝑓𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,                      (2) 
where 𝑖 = 1, 2, …., N refers to the cross-section of units (firms in this case) at time 𝓉. The dependent 
variables are the ratios of domestic bank debt over total debt (𝐷𝑜 𝑖  𝑇𝑜  ) and proceeds from 
foreign currency (FX) borrowings over total debt ( 𝐹𝑋 𝑇𝑜  ). The main variables of interest in these 
models are the regional financial cycle (RFCy) and global financial cycle ( 𝑦).  is a vector 
of firm-specific characteristics such as size, liquidity, tangibility, and export firm status, and  is 
a vector of domestic factors to account for demand-side considerations of credit such as GDP 
growth, stock returns, and interbank rate. All explanatory variables are lagged one period to reduce 
possible simultaneity problems.13 Finally, we include firm-level (𝑓𝑖) fixed effects to control for 
firm heterogeneity. 
Table 3 reports the results of the baseline models provided in equations (1) and (2). We 
report the results for domestic bank debt ratio in columns 1-2, followed by the results of FX debt 
ratio in columns 3-4 of Table 3. We find a positive and significant effect of the regional financial 
cycle on firms’ domestic bank debt, even after controlling for the global financial cycle.14 We do 
not find any evidence of significant impact of the global financial cycle on domestic corporate 
debt. Turning to the results of FX debt, we find a positive and significant effect of the global 
financial cycle on FX debt with no significant impact of the regional financial cycle. We find these 
 
13 We provide the correlation matrix of all control variables used in the empirical models in Table A1 of the Appendix. 
14 We also confirm our main findings by removing the GFC period from our sample. These results are not reported in 
the paper for brevity but are available upon request from the authors. 
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effects to be economically significant. For instance, controlling for the global financial cycle in 
column 2, we find a one unit increase in regional financial cycle increases domestic bank 
borrowings by 1.9%. Similarly, the economic magnitudes in column 4 show a one unit increase in 
global financial cycle increases FX borrowings by 22.3%. 
These findings show evidence of considerable regional financial integration in credit 
markets. They also indicate that the exposure to global and regional financial cycles is associated 
with different sectors of the financial system, stressing the importance of studying disaggregated 
data for corporate borrowings as opposed to aggregated corporate debt or leverage. In particular, 
we show that regional financial integration is related to the domestic banking sector in India that 
plays a key role in the exposure of corporate debt to the regional financial cycle. On the other hand, 
FX debt, which includes foreign bank lending and international bond issuances, is related to global 
financing conditions as opposed to the regional ones. 
Moving to firm-level and other macro control variables, we find a positive and significant 
impact of firms’ size, liquidity, tangibility and export firm status on domestic and foreign 
borrowings suggesting that larger, creditworthy and exporting firms have better access to external 
finance. Finally, we find that firms are able to access higher domestic bank borrowings when the 
domestic economy improves as indicated by a higher GDP, when the stock market performance is 
positive as indicated by higher stock return, and when funding costs in the domestic interbank 
market are low as indicated by lower interbank rate. 
4.3 Focus on the regional drivers of the financial cycle  
In this section, we turn the attention to the specific drivers of the regional financial cycle by 
analyzing the exposure of domestic and FX credit markets in India to bank funding conditions and 
monetary policies in the main regional lending countries.15 Specifically, we re-estimate equations 
(1) and (2) by substituting the regional financial cycle (RFCy) and global financial cycle ( 𝑦) 
with different regional and global factors. The regional factors include the regional interbank rate, 
regional yield spread and regional policy rate, while the global factors include the corresponding 
US interbank rate, US yield spread and US policy rate.  
 




We report the results for domestic bank debt ratio in columns 1-3, followed by the results 
of FX debt ratio in columns 4-6 of Table 4. Focusing on the conditions of the banking sector of 
key lenders in the region, we find an increase in domestic debt when the interbank rates in the 
region decline, controlling for domestic and global interbank rates. Turning to the monetary policy 
factors, we find a significant impact of regional yield spreads on domestic debt showing a decline 
in corporate debt when the yield curve steepens, and the monetary policy tightens across key lender 
countries in the region. The economic magnitudes in columns 1-3 suggest that one unit increases 
in regional interbank rate, yield spreads and policy rate reduce domestic bank borrowings by 
1.6%, 0.9% and 2.8%, respectively. 
Among the global factors reported in Table 4, we find a significant impact of only the US 
interbank rate on domestic corporate debt, and the effect is much weaker in magnitude than the 
regional one.16 We find no significant impact of the US yield spread and policy rate on domestic 
corporate debt. Focusing on FX debt, we find significant and negative effects of the global factors 
on FX debt indicating a decline in FX debt when the US interbank rates are higher, the US yield 
curve steepens, and the US monetary policy tightens. The economic magnitudes in columns 4-6 
suggest that a one unit increase in US interbank rate, yield spreads and policy rate reduce foreign 
borrowings by 0.8%, 1.1% and 0.6%, respectively. Finally, the other firm and macro control 
variables behave as conjectured. 
When we extend this analysis further by focusing on the banking conditions in individual 
regional lending countries in Table 5, we find that domestic corporate debt increases when 
Japanese, Australian, and Singaporean banking conditions ease and interbank rates decline. 
However, we find that the Japanese interbank rates have the largest magnitude effect (4.8%) on 
the domestic debt as compared to Australia (1.2%) and Singapore (0.9%). Focusing on the results 
of FX debt, we continue to find a significant impact of the global factors with no significant effect 
of the regional factors. 
 
16 To account for the bilateral trade linkages between India and the UK, we consider the UK factors as alternative 
measures for the global (US) factors. We find that results for the regional financial cycle using this global measure 
are qualitatively and quantitatively similar to the main results provided in the paper. We do not report these results for 




Next, in Table 6 we focus on the different indicators of regional monetary policy across 
Japan, Australia and Singapore. We find a negative and significant impact of yield spread and 
policy rate on domestic corporate debt, implying a decline in domestic debt when the yield curve 
steepens and the monetary policy tightens in all the countries, with the strongest effect originating 
from Japan. With respect to FX debt, we find significant impact of only the global factors with no 
significant effect of the regional factors. 
Turning to the monetary policy uncertainty, we find that both domestic and FX debt 
declines when there is monetary policy uncertainty in the Japan and US. In this case, the effect is 
stronger for the US factor. This is consistent with the evidence from the 2013 taper tantrum episode 
whereby the US monetary policy uncertainty triggered capital flow reversals in EMs (Bank for 
International Settlements, 2013). This finding is particularly relevant for EMs given the expected 
change in the stance of US monetary policy in the near future to respond to the higher inflation 
triggered by the recovery from the Covid-19 pandemic.17  
4.4 Transmission channel of foreign vs domestic banks 
So far, we have documented a significant impact of the regional financial cycle on domestic credit 
markets. We have also shown that regional interbank markets play a key role in the transmission 
of this effect. Understanding the transmission channel is especially relevant for the policy 
implications. If foreign banks are more likely to channel foreign shocks, countries may rely on 
capital controls or FX-based MP measures to manage their exposure. Else, if it is the domestic 
banking sector that channels regional factors in domestic credit markets, MP measures targeting 
the banking sector may be more appropriate.   
The Indian banking sector comprises domestic state-owned and private banks, and offices 
of foreign banks operating as branches (Berger et al., 2008; Gormley, 2010; Allen, Babus and 
Carletti, 2012).18 There are 44 foreign banks operating over 250 branches as of 2020. Recently, 
foreign banks have been issued licenses to operate as subsidiaries, and in 2020 there are 2 foreign 
 
17 The taper tantrum episode has shown that monetary policy spillover effects may originate not only from the 
uncertainty in US monetary policy but also from the divergence of the monetary policy stance in the US from that of 
other advanced economies. Hence, we look into the impact of divergence in an additional analysis in section 5.2. 
18 Looking at the banking structure in our sample, we do not find evidence for one or few common lenders dominating 
the banking sector. Moreover, we have separated the sample of firms based on private and state ownership and we do 
not find qualitatively different results between the two groups, indicating no particular role of state ownership in the 
credit market exposure to the regional financial cycle.  
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subsidiaries from Singapore and Mauritius that commenced operations in December 2018 and 
March 2019, respectively. To disentangle the effect of domestic versus affiliates of foreign banks, 
we rely on the insights from the literature that investigates the impact of foreign banks on domestic 
credit markets. This literature documents how, facing severe information asymmetries on 
prospective borrowers, foreign banks rely on hard information to lend to domestic firms (Mian, 
2006; Berger et al., 2008).  
Following this literature, we take advantage of our rich database and test whether the 
borrowings of more transparent firms exhibit greater exposure to the regional financial cycle. We 
exploit firm heterogeneity by dividing firms into two groups based on several measures of 
information transparency and monitoring costs (Beck et al., 2018; Naaraayanan and Nielsen, 
2021). We classify a firm as more transparent if it is larger in size and have higher collateral (based 
on the above-median values of the respective distributions of all the firms in that particular year), 
if it is audited, and have multiple banking relationships. Also, following the literature, we consider 
foreign firms and firms that belong to a business group as they are more likely to borrow from a 
foreign bank (Mian, 2006; Berger et al., 2008). We estimate equations (1) and (2) for more and 
less transparent firms separately and we report these results in Tables 7-8. 
In Table 7, columns 1-8 provide results for domestic debt ratio, followed by the results of 
FX debt ratio in columns 9-16. We find a positive and significant effect of the regional financial 
cycle on firms’ domestic debt only for larger, audited, higher collateral, and multiple banking firms 
which are considered more transparent firms with lower monitoring costs, while no significant 
impact of regional cycle on their counterparts. The economic magnitude suggests that a one unit 
increase in the regional financial cycle increases domestic corporate debt by 2.7%, 2.3%, 2.6% 
and 3.6% for larger, audited, higher collateral, and multiple banking firms, respectively. Turning 
to the results of FX debt ratio, we find a positive and significant effect of the global financial cycle 
on FX debt only for the more transparent firms with no significant impact on their counterparts. 
These findings show that firms with hard information are more exposed to the regional and global 
financial cycles than other firms. Given the evidence in the literature, this suggests that affiliates 
of foreign banks, that are more likely to rely on hard information, are likely to act as transmission 
channel for the regional and global financial cycles as opposed to domestic banks. 
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Moving to the results reported in Table 8, columns 1-4 provide results for domestic debt 
ratio, followed by the results of FX debt ratio in columns 5-8. We find a positive and significant 
effect of the regional financial cycle on firms’ domestic debt for all firms irrespective of their 
ownership and membership to business groups. Turning to the global financial cycle, we find a 
positive and significant effect of the global financial cycle on corporate FX debt only for those 
firms that are foreign-owned and part of a group, with no significant impact on their counterparts. 
These findings are consistent with the evidence in Mian (2006) that differentiate between regional 
and global banks and show that regional banks rely relatively more on soft information than global 
banks. Indeed, our results suggest that global banks are more likely to establish banking 
relationship with those firms that are foreign and part of a group, that are generally more 
transparent and requiring less monitoring, whereas regional banks do not differentiate among these 
criteria.  
4.5 Regional financial cycle and policy responses 
In this section, we study the effectiveness of various macroeconomic policies to manage the 
exposure of credit markets to the regional financial cycle. Specifically, we augment our baseline 
model provided in equation (1) by interacting the regional financial cycle (RFCy) with various 
policy indicators to account for MPs, capital controls and FX regime. In details, we estimate the 
following equation: 
𝐷𝑜 𝑖  𝑇𝑜  𝑖 = + 𝑅 𝑦 − ∗ 𝑙𝑖 𝑦 − +  𝑅 𝑦 − + 𝑙𝑖 𝑦 − + 𝑖 − + − + 𝑓𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,    (3) 
where policy indicates macroprudential policy, sectoral openness, and exchange rate regime. We 
estimate the equation with one policy measure at a time. Since the baseline results do not show 
any evidence of a significant impact of the regional financial cycle on FX debt, we do not estimate 
these regressions for FX borrowings.  
We report these results in Table 9. In column 1, we start with the macroprudential policy 
and find significant evidence of its effectiveness to tackle credit market exposure to the regional 
financial cycle. In particular, we find that although domestic corporate debt increases with the 
regional financial cycle, the effect is reduced by MP actions. The economic magnitude suggests 
that a one standard deviation increase in MP actions reduces the effect of regional financial cycle 
on domestic corporate debt by 0.8%. 
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Turning to the measure of capital controls (sectoral openness) in column 2, we find that 
the effect of regional financial cycle on domestic corporate debt is stronger in those sectors of the 
economy that are open to foreign investors. This implies that capital controls that restrict entry of 
foreign investors in domestic sectors of the economy are effective as a means to shield domestic 
credit markets from the shifts in regional financing conditions. The economic magnitude suggests 
that a one standard deviation increase in sectoral openness increases the effect of regional cycle 
by 7%. 
Finally, we document the impact of exchange rate regime in column 3 and find that when 
authorities manage their currency, that is when exchange rate regime increases, the impact of 
regional financial cycle on domestic corporate debt is stronger. Hence, we document the 
effectiveness of floating exchange rate regimes in shielding countries from the regional financial 
cycle. The economic magnitude suggests that a one standard deviation increase in exchange rate 
regime increases the effect of regional cycle by 0.9%. 
5. Robustness tests 
5.1 China as an emerging regional lender   
In this section, we focus specifically on China as an emerging regional lender.19 Although we 
cannot gather the specific contribution of Chinese banks to regional bank flows because China 
does not report consolidated bank claims to the BIS Consolidated Banking Statistics, evidence 
suggests that Chinese banks are expanding abroad at a sustained pace (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 
2018) and they have expanded following the retrenchment of European banks in the post-GFC 
period alongside banks from advanced economies including Japan (International Monetary Fund, 
2015; Bénétrix et al., 2019).20 This has led to greater banking integration in Asian countries 
(International Monetary Fund, 2015) and China, together with Japan, is now a key node for the 
intermediation of US dollars in Asia (Committee on the Global Financial System, 2020). 
Moreover, given the magnitude of the Chinese economy and its economic linkages with other 
countries in the region and all over the world, spillovers from China also arise due to its economic 
 
19 A study of monetary policy in China is provided in Deng et al. (2015). 
20 Data from the BIS Locational Banking Statistics suggest that Chinese banks’ foreign claims versus the rest of the 
world amount to USD 2.4 trillion at the end of 2020, from USD 1.4 trillion at the end of 2015 when its reporting 
started. Koch and Remolona (2018) mentioned that China is now the third largest provider of US dollar credit to the 
international banking system. 
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performance (International Monetary Fund, 2016). Indeed, recent shocks to EMs capital flows 
have originated in China. Capital flows in EMs have been especially volatile following the 
economic slowdown in China during 2015 and the escalated trade tensions between China and the 
US in 2018 (Bank for International Settlements, 2015, 2018). This is also evident in Figure 1 that 
shows a decline in the regional financial cycle in Asia in these periods.  
We report the impact of financing conditions in China on corporate debt in Table 10. We 
find that tighter bank funding conditions and monetary policy in China significantly reduce 
domestic corporate debt but does not have any significant impact on FX debt. These results are 
consistent with the evidence related to other large regional lenders, but the magnitude effect is 
much smaller than that of other regional lenders (as reported in Tables 5 and 6) which signals an 
increasing but still relatively limited influence of Chinese factors on credit markets in the region. 
5.2 Monetary policy divergence between Japan and US 
In the main analysis, we document a significant impact of US monetary policy uncertainty on 
domestic and FX corporate debt. The evidence of the detrimental impact of US monetary policy 
uncertainty on EMs capital flows is evident from the market events around the 2013 taper tantrum 
episode. In addition to increased uncertainty with respect to US monetary policy, this episode has 
also marked the beginning of the divergence of monetary policy between the US and other 
advanced economies. This divergence had dramatic effects on global credit, altering the 
sensitivities of bank flows and corporate debt to global liquidity (Avdjiev et al., 2020; Banti and 
Bose, 2021). Following Avdjiev et al. (2020), we measure the monetary policy divergence between 
the US and the main lender Japan with the difference between the 3-month Euro-dollar and Euro-
Yen futures. Given the higher prices of Euro-yen futures, the measure divergence is negative. 
Hence, monetary policy divergence is higher, for lower values of divergence. 
We report the results of monetary policy divergence in Table 11. In general, higher 
monetary policy divergence is associated with higher corporate debt, both domestic and FX. The 
coefficient of the interaction term “Regional financial cycle*divergence” shows that higher the 
divergence in the monetary policy between the US and Japan, the stronger is the impact of the 
regional financial cycle on domestic corporate debt. Turning to FX debt, the divergence has no 
effect on the exposure to the regional financial cycle that remains insignificant. These findings are 
particularly relevant for EMs as monetary policy in the major financial centers, including Japan 
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and the US, is expected to change in the near future. We show here that it is not only the direction 
of the policy stance in the major financial centers that is relevant for EMs, but also its convergence 
or divergence across these major financial systems. 
5.3 Endogeneity concerns 
We use instrumental variable estimations such as two-staged least squares (2SLS) to tackle 
endogeneity problems in our main estimations. The motivation behind this model is to control for 
unobserved firm-specific characteristics that might be correlated with the firm's balance sheet 
conditions and financing structure, especially firms' ability or willingness to hold domestic and 
foreign debt. We already use lagged independent variables to reduce simultaneity bias in our main 
specifications. To solve any further concerns of endogeneity, we require observed instruments that 
are strongly correlated with the firm-level variables but uncorrelated with the error term. Hence, 
we instrument these variables using their own values lagged twice. It is generally agreed that 
lagged variables (referred as the ‘internal’ instruments) are distributed independently of the error 
process and that they are sufficiently correlated with the included endogenous regressors. Hence, 
they are frequently used as instruments in the literature (Bose et el., 2019; Banti and Bose, 2021). 
The validity and relevance of the instruments are verified using a number of diagnostic tests. The 
under-identification test is distributed as chi-square under the null of under-identification. The 
Hansen J statistic is a test of the over-identifying restrictions, distributed as chi-square under the 
null of instrument validity. 
The results of 2SLS are provided in Table 12 and confirm the results from our main 
estimations. We continue to find a positive and significant effect of the regional financial cycle on 
firms’ domestic debt even after controlling for the global financial cycle, and a significant effect 
of the global financial cycle on FX debt with no significant impact of the regional financial cycle. 
Further, we find a positive and significant effect of the regional financial cycle on firms’ domestic 
debt only for firms which are considered more transparent with lower monitoring costs with no 
significant impact of regional cycle on their counterparts. Finally, we document the effectiveness 
of macroeconomic policies such as MPs and capital controls and of a floating FX regime to tackle 




In this paper, we extend previous work on financial cycles and document the emergence of a 
regional financial cycle in Asia. The Asian banks have grown to be important providers of credit 
in the region, and beyond. While there is evidence in the literature of emergence of key lenders 
from Japan and China, the rise of a regional financial cycle and its implications on the dynamics 
of domestic credit markets in the region has been neglected in the literature. By exploiting a 
detailed firm-level dataset of domestic and FX corporate debt for 24,169 non-financial Indian firms 
over the period 2001-2019, we provide significant evidence of the exposure of domestic credit 
markets to the regional financial cycle in Asia, comparing and contrasting it with the exposure to 
the global financial cycle. We find that disentangling the effect of external financing conditions 
on domestic and FX corporate debt allows for a more precise identification of the influence of 
external factors on domestic credit markets. In particular, we find that domestic corporate debt is 
exposed to the regional financial cycle only, whereas the global financial cycle only affects FX 
corporate debt. With respect to the regional financial cycle, we show that both interbank funding 
markets and monetary policy in the region act as transmission channels. Consistently with the 
documented increasing relevance of Japanese banks in cross-border bank flows around the world, 
we find that Japanese factors have the strongest influence on domestic credit, compared to other 
regional lenders. In the case of China, we also find evidence of an emerging but still relatively 
limited effect of Chinese factors. Further, we show that transparent firms with lower monitoring 
costs are more exposed to the regional financial cycle in the domestic credit markets, signaling a 
potentially key role of domestic offices of regional banks as transmission channels. 
Finally, we build on the evidence related to global factors in the literature and study the 
policy actions that countries can adopt to manage their exposure to the regional financial cycle. 
We document that MPs are indeed relatively successful at mitigating the exposure of domestic 
credit markets to the regional financial cycle. Moreover, we find that the implementation of 
selective capital controls and floating currency regimes limit the impact of the regional financial 
cycle on domestic corporate debt. These results underline the importance for policy makers to be 
vigilant of regional and global financial shocks, thus pointing towards a need for carefully designed 
policy actions. The evidence we provide on the exposure to regional factors is key in this respect, 
given the profound differences with respect to EMs exposure to global factors. Thus, our policy 
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Figure 1: Regional financial cycle in Asia 
 
 
Notes: The figure reports the regional financial cycle (solid line) together with the global financial cycle 
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Notes: The table reports the average pairwise correlation of bank flows for each country versus the other 
countries in the region. Bank flows for each country are calculated as the difference in the cross-border 
bank claims of all BIS reporting banks versus all sectors for each country.
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Mean Median Standard Deviation 
Firm-level measures 
Domestic debt/Total debt 0.65 0.72 0.32 
FX debt/Total debt 0.39 0.29 0.33 
Size (log) 6.52 6.43 1.95 
Liquidity 1.07 0.64 2.97 
Tangibility 0.31 0.30 0.25 
Export firm 0.36 0 0.48 
Regional factors 
Regional interbank rate (%) 1.55 1.27 0.86 
Regional yield spread (%) 7.99 7.22 3.77 
Regional policy rate (%) 1.77 1.39 0.88 
JP interbank rate (%) 0.07 0.07 0.15 
AUS interbank rate (%) 3.37 2.69 1.76 
SG interbank rate (%) 0.85 0.50 0.86 
JP yield spread (%) 0.76 0.70 0.43 
AUS yield spread (%) 5.78 5.90 4.22 
SG yield spread (%) 12.62 14.18 6.18 
JP policy rate (%) 0.31 0.30 0.15 
AUS policy rate (%) 3.39 2.73 1.76 
SG policy rate (%) 0.73 0.25 0.88 
Monetary policy uncertainty (JP) 114.04 110.43 36.28 
Global factors 
Global financial cycle -0.01 -0.01 0.04 
US interbank rate (%) 1.24 0.54 1.49 
US yield spread (%) 1.34 1.45 0.81 
US policy rate (%) 1.27 0.39 1.47 
Monetary policy uncertainty (US) 119.81 105 44.14 
Domestic factors 
GDP growth (%) 7.19 7.41 1.85 
Stock returns 0.14 0.12 0.17 
Interbank rate (%) 6.78 6.25 1.16 
Policy actions 
Macroprudential policy (MP) 1.66 2 2.62 
Sectoral openness (%) 89.56 100 23.32 
Exchange rate regime 0.40 0 0.49 
Notes: The table reports the statistics of all variables used in the estimated models. Domestic debt/Total debt is the ratio of proceeds from domestic 
currency bank borrowings over total debt. FX debt/Total debt is the ratio of proceeds from foreign currency borrowings (in INR million) over total 
debt. Size is the logarithm of total real assets. Liquidity is the ratio of quick assets to quick liabilities. Tangibility is the ratio of net fixed assets to 
total real assets. Export firm is a dummy for firms with positive exports, and zero otherwise. Regional interbank rate, JP interbank rate, AUS 
interbank rate, SG interbank rate is the average money market interbank rate in the region, Japan, Australia, and Singapore, respectively. Regional 
yield spread, JP yield spread, AUS yield spread, SG yield spread is the average difference between 10-year and 2-year government yields in the 
region, Japan, Australia, and Singapore, respectively. Regional policy rate, JP policy rate, AUS policy rate, SG policy rate is the average policy 
rate in the region, Japan, Australia, and Singapore, respectively. Monetary policy uncertainty in Japan (JP) is from Arbatli et al. (2019). Global 
financial cycle is the first difference of the common factor in bank flows around the world. US interbank rate is the US money market interbank 
rate. US yield spread is the difference between 10-year and 2-year Treasury yields. US policy rate is the Fed funds rate. Monetary policy uncertainty 
in the US is from Baker, Bloom and Davis (2016). GDP growth is the annual real GDP growth for India. Stock returns are the log returns of the 
stock market index of the Indian stock exchange. Interbank rate is the money market interbank rate in India. Macroprudential policy (MP) is the 
aggregated MP index by Alam et al. (2019) that is the annual sum of policy actions coded as dummies, +1 for tightening and -1 for loosening 
actions. Sectoral openness is the maximum share of foreign ownership allowed by regulation in the firms’ sectors. Exchange rate regime is the 
Shambaugh (2004) indicator that is a dummy taking the value of 1 for pegged regimes and 0 for floating regimes. 
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Table 3: Impact of the regional financial cycle on corporate debt 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable= Domestic debt/Total debt FX debt/Total debt 
Regional financial cycle 0.015*** 0.019*** 0.007 0.009 
 (5.01) (6.48) (0.55) (0.71) 
Global financial cycle - -0.010 - 0.223** 
  (-0.35)  (2.04) 
Size 0.007*** 0.010*** 0.055*** 0.051*** 
 (4.44) (5.94) (4.56) (4.30) 
Liquidity 0.001* 0.001* 0.005*** 0.005*** 
 (1.79) (1.85) (3.05) (3.03) 
Tangibility 0.078*** 0.079*** 0.086*** 0.087*** 
 (5.24) (5.26) (3.28) (3.29) 
Export firm 0.010*** 0.008*** 0.020* 0.019* 
 (3.42) (2.63) (1.85) (1.71) 
GDP growth 0.003*** 0.005*** 0.001 0.003 
 (6.00) (8.73) (0.04) (1.21) 
Stock returns 0.016*** 0.027*** 0.029* -0.002 
 (3.41) (5.58) (1.71) (-0.11) 
Interbank rate -0.004*** -0.004*** 0.001 0.001 
 (-4.50) (-6.22) (0.21) (0.19) 
Constant 0.625*** 0.599*** 0.864*** 0.823*** 
 (46.82) (46.53) (7.83) (7.58) 
Observations 173,325 173,325 6,960 6,960 
R-squared 0.005 0.006 0.033 0.034 
Number of firms 24,169 24,169 1,937 1,937 
 
Notes: The table reports the results of equations (1) and (2). Domestic debt/Total debt is the ratio of proceeds from domestic 
currency bank borrowings over total debt. FX debt/Total debt is the ratio of proceeds from foreign currency borrowings over total 
debt. Regional financial cycle is the common factor in bank flows to the countries in the region. Global financial cycle is the 
common factor in bank flows to all countries in the BIS database. Firm-level controls are: Size as log of total real assets, Liquidity 
as ratio of quick assets to quick liabilities, Tangibility as ratio of net fixed assets to total real assets, Export firm is a dummy for 
firms with positive exports, and zero otherwise. Domestic controls are: GDP growth as real GDP growth, Stock returns as returns 
of the stock market index, Interbank rate as the money market interest rate. All equations include firm fixed effects. All control 





Table 4: Impact of regional factors on domestic credit market 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent variable= Domestic debt/Total debt FX debt/Total debt 


























Regional factors -0.016*** -0.009*** -0.028*** 0.011 0.001 -0.004 
 (-10.40) (-5.06) (-9.00) (1.40) (0.29) (-0.44) 
Global factors -0.003*** -0.002 0.002 -0.008*** -0.011** -0.006* 
 (-5.27) (-1.60) (1.23) (-3.59) (-1.98) (-1.82) 
Size 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.011*** 0.043*** 0.047*** 0.043*** 
 (6.43) (6.07) (6.97) (4.91) (5.29) (4.93) 
Liquidity 0.001* 0.001* 0.001* 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 
 (1.84) (1.87) (1.86) (2.90) (2.91) (2.89) 
Tangibility 0.080*** 0.079*** 0.080*** 0.075*** 0.078*** 0.074*** 
 (5.25) (5.29) (5.26) (2.84) (2.94) (2.80) 
Export firm 0.007** 0.007** 0.007** 0.018 0.023** 0.020* 
 (2.44) (2.50) (2.31) (1.60) (2.05) (1.81) 
GDP growth 0.002*** 0.007*** 0.002*** 0.001 0.002 0.006*** 
 (4.96) (15.84) (3.95) (0.90) (0.91) (3.93) 
Stock returns 0.074*** -0.026*** 0.085*** 0.034 -0.023 0.073*** 
 (12.88) (-5.28) (13.03) (1.62) (-0.91) (2.80) 
Interbank rate -0.003*** -0.002*** -0.004*** 0.001 0.001 -0.003 
 (-3.93) (-2.96) (-4.21) (0.10) (0.34) (-0.88) 
Constant 0.596*** 0.589*** 0.592*** 0.752*** 0.798*** 0.820*** 
 (45.38) (45.63) (44.34) (9.55) (9.93) (10.27) 
Observations 173,325 173,325 173,325 6,960 6,960 6,960 
R-squared 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.038 0.036 0.039 
Number of firms 24,169 24,169 24,169 1,937 1,937 1,937 
 
Notes: The table reports the results of equations (1) and (2) with regional and global factors. Domestic debt/Total debt is the ratio 
of proceeds from domestic currency bank borrowings over total debt. FX debt/Total debt is the ratio of proceeds from foreign 
currency borrowings over total debt. Regional factors are the average interbank rate, the average regional yield spread, as the 
difference between 10-year and 2-year government yields, and the average policy rate in the main lender countries in the region, 
as indicated in the columns. Global factors are the respective measures in the US. Firm-level controls are: Size as log of total real 
assets, Liquidity as ratio of quick assets to quick liabilities, Tangibility as ratio of net fixed assets to total real assets, Export firm is 
a dummy for firms with positive exports, and zero otherwise. Domestic controls are: GDP growth as real GDP growth, Stock 
returns as returns of the stock market index, Interbank rate as the money market interest rate. All equations include firm fixed 





Table 5: Regional heterogeneity in bank funding conditions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent 
variable= 
Domestic debt/Total debt FX debt/Total debt 
























Regional factors -0.048*** -0.012*** -0.009*** 0.009 -0.002 -0.001 
 (-8.88) (-13.47) (-7.09) (0.39) (-0.54) (-0.12) 
Global factors -0.006*** -0.007*** -0.002** -0.005** -0.005* -0.005* 
 (-10.10) (-10.35) (-2.50) (-1.97) (-1.90) (-1.88) 
Size 0.009*** 0.011*** 0.009*** 0.044*** 0.044*** 0.044*** 
 (5.83) (6.78) (5.75) (5.01) (5.01) (4.99) 
Liquidity 0.001* 0.001* 0.001* 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 
 (1.81) (1.85) (1.81) (2.89) (2.89) (2.89) 
Tangibility 0.079*** 0.079*** 0.078*** 0.074*** 0.074*** 0.074*** 
 (5.24) (5.25) (5.26) (2.80) (2.81) (2.80) 
Export firm 0.008*** 0.007** 0.008*** 0.022** 0.022** 0.022** 
 (2.61) (2.40) (2.71) (2.00) (1.99) (1.97) 
GDP growth 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 
 (6.46) (3.55) (5.85) (4.10) (3.90) (4.39) 
Stock returns 0.071*** 0.092*** 0.050*** 0.057*** 0.066*** 0.060*** 
 (13.29) (14.18) (11.12) (3.12) (2.62) (3.16) 
Interbank rate -0.002** -0.005*** -0.002*** -0.003 -0.004 -0.003 
 (-2.33) (-5.80) (-2.67) (-1.00) (-0.98) (-0.96) 
Constant 0.590*** 0.605*** 0.598*** 0.838*** 0.840*** 0.835*** 
 (45.00) (45.82) (45.65) (10.31) (10.19) (10.26) 
Observations 173,325 173,325 173,325 6,960 6,960 6,960 
R-squared 0.006 0.006 0.005 0.039 0.039 0.039 
Number of firms 24,169 24,169 24,169 1,937 1,937 1,937 
 
Notes: The table reports the results of equations (1) and (2) with regional and global factors, where regional factors are the factors 
from Japan (JP), Australia (AUS) and Singapore (SG), as indicated in the columns. Domestic debt/Total debt is the ratio of proceeds 
from domestic currency bank borrowings over total debt. FX debt/Total debt is the ratio of proceeds from foreign currency 
borrowings over total debt. Regional factors are the interbank rates. Global factors are the respective US-based measures. Firm-
level controls are: Size as log of total real assets, Liquidity as ratio of quick assets to quick liabilities, Tangibility as ratio of net 
fixed assets to total real assets, Export firm is a dummy for firms with positive exports, and zero otherwise. Domestic controls are: 
GDP growth as real GDP growth, Stock returns as returns of the stock market index, Interbank rate as the money market interest 
rate. All equations include firm fixed effects. All control variables are lagged by one time period. Statistical significance is denoted 
at 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*). 
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Table 6: Regional heterogeneity in monetary policy 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
Dependent 
variable= 
Domestic debt/Total debt FX debt/Total debt 
























































Regional factors -0.014*** -0.002*** -0.001** -0.037*** -0.010*** -0.018*** -0.015*** -0.005 -0.001 0.002 0.001 -0.002 0.017* -0.053*** 
 (-5.42) (-7.87) (-2.57) (-6.37) (-12.71) (-7.34) (-4.82) (-0.43) (-0.56) (1.58) (0.01) (-0.73) (1.68) (-3.99) 
Global factors -0.001 0.002 0.004 -0.008*** -0.006*** 0.001 -0.026*** -0.009** -0.010** -0.023** -0.010** -0.007* -0.021*** -0.048*** 
 (-1.33) (1.25) (1.52) (-9.28) (-9.89) (0.70) (-8.42) (-2.02) (-2.06) (-2.07) (-2.20) (-1.87) (-3.60) (-3.55) 
Size 0.006*** 0.011*** 0.012*** 0.009*** 0.010*** -0.001 0.013*** 0.048*** 0.045*** 0.045*** 0.043*** 0.043*** 0.043*** 0.037*** 
 (4.17) (7.15) (6.21) (6.02) (6.15) (-0.75) (7.81) (5.38) (5.01) (5.09) (4.83) (4.93) (4.85) (4.08) 
Liquidity 0.001* 0.001* 0.001* 0.001* 0.001* 0.001* 0.001* 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 
 (1.79) (1.91) (1.79) (1.83) (1.83) (1.76) (1.91) (2.90) (2.89) (2.92) (2.85) (2.89) (2.66) (2.88) 
Tangibility 0.078*** 0.080*** 0.074*** 0.079*** 0.079*** 0.063*** 0.080*** 0.076*** 0.077*** 0.080*** 0.072*** 0.073*** 0.078*** 0.072*** 
 (5.24) (5.31) (5.16) (5.24) (5.25) (4.37) (5.29) (2.88) (2.95) (3.03) (2.71) (2.78) (3.19) (2.73) 
Export firm 0.010*** 0.007** 0.010*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.004 0.006** 0.024** 0.022** 0.023** 0.015 0.020* 0.017 0.017 
 (3.45) (2.33) (3.38) (2.72) (2.78) (1.36) (2.02) (2.19) (1.99) (2.05) (1.34) (1.84) (1.55) (1.53) 
GDP growth 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.002*** 0.001 -0.001 0.002*** 0.003** 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.007*** 0.005*** 0.003** 
 (11.02) (12.50) (10.15) (4.76) (0.77) (-0.62) (7.32) (2.11) (0.91) (0.07) (1.27) (3.60) (3.23) (2.15) 
Stock returns 0.003 0.028*** 0.002 0.058*** 0.072*** 0.050*** 0.026*** -0.001 0.015 0.014 0.036** 0.076*** 0.029 -0.006 
 (0.87) (9.02) (0.43) (10.61) (13.05) (9.12) (6.57) (-0.09) (0.93) (0.99) (2.21) (3.05) (1.46) (-0.39) 
Interbank rate -0.003*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.001 0.004 0.001 0.002 -0.003 -0.002 0.001 
 (-3.40) (-3.42) (-3.16) (-3.47) (-6.07) (-5.04) (-4.29) (-0.10) (1.29) (0.02) (0.69) (-0.95) (-0.80) (0.37) 
Constant 0.615*** 0.583*** 0.585*** 0.603*** 0.626*** 0.702*** 0.782*** 0.836*** 0.757*** 0.785*** 0.727*** 0.827*** 0.822*** 1.200*** 
 (48.08) (45.78) (39.77) (46.98) (47.33) (50.82) (27.31) (10.27) (9.09) (9.93) (8.63) (10.07) (10.39) (8.85) 
Observations 173,325 173,325 173,319 173,325 173,325 173,325 173,325 6,960 6,960 6,960 6,960 6,960 6,960 6,960 
R-squared 0.004 0.006 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.039 0.039 0.039 0.039 0.039 0.039 0.040 
Number of firms 24,169 24,169 24,168 24,169 24,169 24,169 24,169 1,937 1,937 1,937 1,937 1,937 1,937 1,921 
 
Notes: The table reports the results of equations (1) and (2) with regional and global factors, where regional factors are the factors from Japan (JP), Australia (AUS) and Singapore (SG), as indicated in 
the columns. Domestic debt/Total debt is the ratio of proceeds from domestic currency bank borrowings over total debt. FX debt/Total debt is the ratio of proceeds from foreign currency borrowings over 
total debt.  Regional factors are the yield spread, as the difference between 10-year and 2-year government yields, and policy rate. JP monetary uncertainty is from Arbatli et al. (2019). Global factors are 
the respective measures in the US. Firm-level controls are: Size as log of total real assets, Liquidity as ratio of quick assets to quick liabilities, Tangibility as ratio of net fixed assets to total real assets, 
Export firm is a dummy for firms with positive exports, and zero otherwise. Domestic controls are: GDP growth as real GDP growth, Stock returns as returns of the stock market index, Interbank rate as 
the money market interest rate. All equations include firm fixed effects. All control variables are lagged by one time period. Statistical significance is denoted at 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*). 
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Table 7: Accounting for firm-level transparency 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
Dependent 
variable= 































Regional  0.027*** -0.001 0.023*** 0.008 0.026*** 0.007 0.036*** 0.018 -0.020 -0.027 -0.019 0.053 -0.014 -0.003 -0.002 -0.044 
financial 
cycle 
(7.44) (-0.26) (6.97) (1.20) (7.02) (1.48) (4.88) (1.57) (-1.55) (-0.90) (-1.41) (0.89) (-1.10) (-0.09) (-0.08) (-0.85) 
Global  -0.043 0.011 -0.023 0.071 0.005 0.044 -0.082 -0.100 0.192** 0.300 0.163** 0.057 0.190* 0.182 0.222** -0.514 
financial 
cycle 
(-1.32) (0.23) (-0.71) (1.34) (0.14) (0.99) (-1.38) (-1.21) (2.34) (0.99) (2.06) (0.20) (1.74) (1.20) (2.05) (-1.58) 
Size 0.008*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.009*** 0.018*** 0.007*** 0.017*** 0.020*** 0.047*** 0.001 0.045*** 0.023 0.044*** 0.037*** 0.054*** 0.021 
 (4.23) (3.09) (4.89) (2.97) (7.70) (2.69) (4.92) (3.03) (4.93) (0.06) (4.48) (1.35) (3.63) (2.68) (3.46) (0.46) 
Liquidity 0.001 0.001* 0.001** 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.005*** 0.002 0.005** 0.001 0.004 0.008** 0.032*** 0.027 
 (1.30) (1.79) (2.56) (0.65) (1.08) (0.86) (1.57) (0.40) (2.81) (0.29) (2.16) (0.91) (1.41) (2.16) (5.68) (1.51) 
Tangibility 0.106*** 0.042* 0.100*** 0.028* 0.104*** 0.006 0.068*** 0.124*** 0.079*** 0.092 0.088*** 0.014 0.094*** 0.090 0.055 0.221* 
 (12.78) (1.94) (11.03) (1.76) (13.16) (0.71) (2.60) (4.53) (2.83) (1.39) (2.90) (0.22) (3.60) (1.38) (0.86) (1.69) 
Export firm 0.002 0.021*** 0.005 0.019*** 0.006* 0.008* 0.016*** 0.017* 0.023** 0.021 0.030** 0.017 0.016 0.059** 0.030* -0.136 
 (0.62) (3.53) (1.49) (2.65) (1.65) (1.79) (2.68) (1.82) (2.00) (0.44) (2.51) (0.40) (1.27) (2.27) (1.89) (-1.38) 
GDP growth 0.005*** 0.002** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.001 0.007*** 0.005 0.008*** 0.006 0.005*** 0.013*** 0.007*** 0.001 
 (7.53) (2.10) (8.04) (4.39) (8.32) (4.76) (4.00) (0.59) (4.14) (1.09) (4.06) (0.83) (2.77) (2.92) (2.98) (0.12) 
Stock returns 0.033*** 0.015* 0.028*** 0.014 0.030*** 0.015* 0.032*** 0.036** 0.052** 0.146** 0.066*** 0.028 0.001 0.117*** 0.018 0.134* 
 (5.77) (1.77) (5.05) (1.46) (5.01) (1.87) (2.82) (2.17) (2.50) (2.03) (3.02) (0.30) (0.01) (2.63) (0.57) (1.77) 
Interbank  -0.005*** -0.000 -0.004*** -0.004** -0.006*** -0.004*** -0.007*** -0.003 -0.001 -0.030* -0.003 0.005 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.011 
rate (-5.91) (-0.30) (-5.45) (-2.42) (-6.20) (-3.28) (-4.14) (-1.17) (-0.26) (-1.90) (-0.93) (0.44) (-0.10) (-0.08) (-0.03) (0.73) 
Constant 0.617*** 0.588*** 0.599*** 0.585*** 0.561*** 0.609*** 0.537*** 0.588*** 0.857*** 0.422** 0.858*** 0.603*** 0.827*** 0.758*** 0.829*** 0.064 
 (40.02) (28.98) (37.24) (28.74) (33.10) (33.19) (18.13) (13.67) (9.24) (2.48) (9.05) (4.93) (7.66) (5.90) (5.35) (0.16) 
Observations 117,047 56,278 125,849 47,476 99,376 73,949 44,619 20,811 6,558 402 6,425 535 4,911 2,049 3,015 328 
R-squared 0.008 0.003 0.007 0.004 0.010 0.002 0.010 0.011 0.041 0.061 0.041 0.032 0.028 0.058 0.083 0.115 
Number of 
firms 
16,173 12,705 19,266 13,671 16,372 15,569 9,235 6,019 1,813 172 1,810 326 1,467 781 796 155 
Notes: The table reports the results of equations (1) and (2). Domestic debt/Total debt is the ratio of proceeds from domestic currency bank borrowings over total debt. FX debt/Total 
debt is the ratio of proceeds from foreign currency borrowings over total debt. Regional financial cycle is the common factor in bank flows to the countries in the region. Global 
financial cycle is the common factor in bank flows to all countries in the BIS database. All equations include firm fixed effects. All control variables are lagged by one time period. 
Statistical significance is denoted at 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*). 
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Table 8: Accounting for firm-level transparency (contd.) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dependent 
variable= 


















Regional  0.051** 0.036*** 0.033*** 0.020*** 0.020 0.012 0.017 -0.016 
financial cycle (2.25) (10.55) (4.79) (6.22) (0.54) (1.01) (0.95) (-1.12) 
Global  0.226 0.002 -0.053 0.048 0.653* 0.163 0.285** 0.177 
financial cycle (1.24) (0.07) (-1.40) (1.60) (1.87) (1.53) (2.08) (1.30) 
Size -0.009 0.010*** 0.001 0.011*** 0.066** 0.038*** 0.023* 0.055*** 
 (-0.88) (6.08) (0.37) (6.08) (2.28) (4.14) (1.71) -5.02) 
Liquidity -0.003 0.001** 0.002** 0.001 0.001 0.014*** 0.011*** 0.004** 
 (-1.42) (1.98) (2.39) (0.55) (0.37) (2.97) (2.86) (2.19) 
Tangibility 0.190*** 0.077*** 0.103*** 0.068*** 0.030 0.096*** 0.063 0.090*** 
 (3.87) (5.14) (6.66) (3.96) (0.28) (3.53) (1.49) (2.79) 
Export firm 0.008 0.008** 0.004 0.010*** 0.005 0.015 0.025 0.018 
 (0.49) (2.55) (0.57) (3.20) (0.16) (1.36) (1.34) (1.35) 
GDP growth 0.006 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.011 0.002 0.008** -0.002 
 (1.48) (9.64) (6.33) (9.45) (1.62) (0.84) (2.07) (-0.75) 
Stock returns 0.011 0.010* 0.016 0.018*** 0.156** 0.010 0.038 0.006 
 (0.30) (1.86) (1.61) (3.39) (2.27) (0.56) (0.89) (0.25) 
Interbank  -0.015*** -0.006*** -0.003 -0.005*** 0.006 0.001 -0.001 0.003 
rate (-2.95) (-7.52) (-1.48) (-5.84) (0.67) (0.31) (-0.24) (0.69) 
Constant 0.830*** 0.603*** 0.600*** 0.601*** 1.029*** 0.688*** 0.484*** 0.890*** 
 (9.28) (46.02) (19.51) (42.52) (3.78) (8.33) (3.60) (9.60) 
Observations 4,543 168,782 34,698 134,727 638 6,321 2,560 4,400 
R-squared 0.019 0.006 0.007 0.005 0.049 0.050 0.033 0.044 
Number of firms 718 23,451 4,517 19,511 181 1,757 609 1,328 
 
Notes: The table reports the results of equations (1) and (2). Domestic debt/Total debt is the ratio of proceeds from domestic 
currency bank borrowings over total debt. FX debt/Total debt is the ratio of proceeds from foreign currency borrowings over total 
debt. Regional financial cycle is the common factor in bank flows to the countries in the region. Global financial cycle is the 
common factor in bank flows to all countries in the BIS database. All equations include firm fixed effects. All control variables are 




Table 9: The regional financial cycle and policy responses 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent variable= Domestic debt/Total debt 
Policy= Macroprudential policy  Sectoral openness Exchange rate regime 
Regional financial cycle*Policy -0.003** 0.003*** 0.019*** 
 (-2.39) (4.81) (3.68) 
Regional financial cycle 0.017*** 0.004 -0.006 
 (4.68) (1.58) (-1.21) 
Policy (See column) 0.002*** - -0.016*** 
 (6.42)  (-11.83) 
Size 0.006*** 0.007*** 0.010*** 
 (3.87) (4.28) (6.50) 
Liquidity 0.001 0.001* 0.001* 
 (1.54) (1.70) (1.79) 
Tangibility 0.076*** 0.077*** 0.078*** 
 (4.90) (5.17) (5.24) 
Export firm 0.012*** 0.010*** 0.008*** 
 (4.02) (3.40) (2.61) 
GDP growth 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.005*** 
 (3.93) (4.75) (11.06) 
Stock returns 0.020*** 0.017*** 0.032*** 
 (3.30) (3.71) (8.89) 
Interbank rate -0.002** -0.004*** -0.004*** 
 (-2.36) (-4.52) (-5.40) 
Constant 0.618*** 0.628*** 0.600*** 
 (45.97) (46.23) (47.31) 
Observations 161,182 168,955 173,325 
R-squared 0.005 0.005 0.007 
Number of firms 23,975 23,631 24,169 
 
Notes: The table reports the results of equation (3). Domestic debt/Total debt is the ratio of proceeds from domestic currency bank 
borrowings over total debt. Regional financial cycle is the common factor in bank flows to the countries in the region. Policy 
indicates macroprudential policy actions, sectoral openness, and exchange rate regime, as indicated in the columns. 
Macroprudential policy is the annual aggregated MP index by Alam et al. (2019) that is the annual sum of policy actions coded as 
dummies, +1 for tightening and -1 for loosening actions. Sectoral openness is the maximum share of foreign ownership allowed 
by regulation in the firms’ sectors. Finally, exchange rate regime is the Shambaugh (2004) indicator that is a dummy taking the 
value of 1 for pegged regimes and 0 for floating regimes. Firm-level controls are: Size as log of total real assets, Liquidity as ratio 
of quick assets to quick liabilities, Tangibility as ratio of net fixed assets to total real assets, Export firm is a dummy for firms with 
positive exports, and zero otherwise. Domestic controls are: GDP growth as real GDP growth, Stock returns as returns of the stock 
market index, Interbank rate as the money market interest rate. All equations include firm fixed effects. All control variables are 




Table 10: China as an emerging lender 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent 
variable= 
Domestic debt/Total debt FX debt/Total debt 
























Regional factors -0.002*** -0.006*** -0.002** -0.002 -0.007 -0.003 
 (-3.87) (-3.74) (-2.03) (-0.90) (-1.12) (-0.68) 
Global factors -0.008*** -0.003*** -0.005*** -0.005* -0.009** -0.012** 
 (-11.23) (-2.95) (-8.36) (-1.74) (-2.05) (-2.32) 
Size 0.004** 0.002 0.008*** 0.045*** 0.049*** 0.044*** 
 (2.28) (1.20) (5.43) (5.15) (5.52) (5.00) 
Liquidity 0.001* 0.001* 0.001* 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 
 (1.65) (1.69) (1.82) (2.86) (2.86) (2.86) 
Tangibility 0.068*** 0.069*** 0.078*** 0.076*** 0.077*** 0.071*** 
 (4.83) (4.84) (5.26) (2.85) (2.88) (2.72) 
Export firm 0.007** 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.022** 0.024** 0.018 
 (2.23) (2.82) (2.97) (1.98) (2.15) (1.63) 
GDP growth 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.001** 0.007*** 0.002 0.002 
 (3.88) (7.15) (2.28) (3.95) (1.65) (1.02) 
Stock returns 0.029*** 0.001 0.042*** 0.065*** 0.012 0.044* 
 (6.19) (0.32) (7.84) (3.10) (0.52) (1.71) 
Interbank rate -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.004 0.001 -0.002 
 (-3.88) (-5.84) (-3.62) (-1.04) (0.10) (-0.59) 
Constant 0.649*** 0.665*** 0.616*** 0.857*** 0.837*** 0.790*** 
 (47.97) (51.56) (44.89) (10.23) (10.14) (10.08) 
Observations 163,224 163,224 173,325 6,866 6,866 6,960 
R-squared 0.004 0.003 24,169 0.040 0.040 0.037 
Number of firms 23,902 23,902 0.005 1,921 1,921 1,937 
 
Notes: The table reports the results of equations (1) and (2) with regional and global factors, where regional factors indicate Chinese 
factors. Domestic debt/Total debt is the ratio of proceeds from domestic currency bank borrowings over total debt. FX debt/Total 
debt is the ratio of proceeds from foreign currency borrowings over total debt. Regional factors are the interbank rates, yield 
spreads, and policy rate for China (CHN) as indicated in the columns. Global factors are the respective US-based measures. Firm-
level controls are: Size as log of total real assets, Liquidity as ratio of quick assets to quick liabilities, Tangibility as ratio of net 
fixed assets to total real assets, Export firm is a dummy for firms with positive exports, and zero otherwise. Domestic controls are: 
GDP growth as real GDP growth, Stock returns as returns of the stock market index, Interbank rate as the money market interest 
rate. All equations include firm fixed effects. All control variables are lagged by one time period. Statistical significance is denoted 




Table 11: Monetary policy divergence 
 (1) (2) 
Dependent  
variable= 
Domestic debt/Total debt FX debt/Total debt 
Regional financial cycle*Divergence -0.010*** -0.009 
 (-4.03) (-0.69) 
Regional financial cycle 0.007** -0.003 
 (2.42) (-0.24) 
Divergence -0.002*** -0.008*** 
 (-4.51) (-2.66) 
Size 0.009*** 0.040*** 
 (5.49) (4.60) 
Liquidity 0.001* 0.005*** 
 (1.84) (2.89) 
Tangibility 0.078*** 0.076*** 
 (5.28) (2.88) 
Export firm 0.009*** 0.021* 
 (3.15) (1.90) 
GDP growth 0.003*** 0.004** 
 (6.04) (1.97) 
Stock returns 0.011** 0.037 
 (2.19) (1.58) 
Interbank rate -0.001 0.001 
 (-1.61) (0.31) 
Constant 0.594*** 0.750*** 
 (45.60) (9.30) 
Observations 173,325 6,960 
R-squared 0.005 0.041 
Number of firms 24,169 1,937 
 
Notes: The table reports the results of equations (1) and (2) augmented with the monetary policy divergence between Japan and the 
US and an interaction term of the regional financial cycle and the monetary policy divergence. Domestic debt/Total debt is the ratio 
of proceeds from domestic currency bank borrowings over total debt. FX debt/Total debt is the ratio of proceeds from foreign 
currency borrowings over total debt. Regional financial cycle is the common factor in bank flows to the countries in the region. 
Divergence is the difference between 3-month Euro-dollar and Euro-yen futures. Firm-level controls are: Size as log of total real 
assets, Liquidity as ratio of quick assets to quick liabilities, Tangibility as ratio of net fixed assets to total real assets, Export firm is 
a dummy for firms with positive exports, and zero otherwise. Domestic controls are: GDP growth as real GDP growth, Stock 
returns as returns of the stock market index, Interbank rate as the money market interest rate. All equations include firm fixed 
effects. All control variables are lagged by one time period. Statistical significance is denoted at 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*).
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Table 12: 2SLS regressions 
Dependent variable= Domestic debt/Total debt FX debt/Total debt 
Panel A: (1) (2) 
Regional financial cycle 0.021*** -0.013 
 (4.06) (-0.68) 
Global financial cycle 0.035 0.193* 
 (1.33) (1.78) 
Observations 146,302 5,906 
Under-identification test 0.000 0.000 
Hansen J statistics 0.040 0.107 
Panel B: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
















High collateral Low collateral 
Regional financial cycle 0.023*** -0.001 0.021*** 0.009 0.012*** 0.006 -0.018 0.130 -0.032 0.004 -0.023 -0.002 
 (4.88) (-0.13) (4.54) (1.02) (2.83) (0.68) (-0.88) (1.30) (-1.36) (0.04) (-1.25) (-0.04) 
Global financial cycle 0.047 0.007 0.046 -0.024 -0.061 -0.024 0.209* -1.252 0.829*** 0.343 0.597*** 0.313 
 (1.54) (0.13) (1.45) (-0.49) (-1.32) (-0.58) (1.88) (-1.36) (3.33) (0.67) (2.80) (0.42) 
Observations 101,155 43,465 109,787 32,975 83,140 59,112 5,607 272 5,547 247 4,136 1,559 
Under-identification test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.093 0.002 0.012 0.000 0.020 
Hansen J statistics 0.567 0.056 0.677 0.625 0.645 0.179 0.086 0.727 0.367 0.435 0.159 0.576 

























Regional financial cycle 0.021** 0.006 0.124** 0.017*** 0.026** 0.019*** -0.035 0.135 -0.011 -0.017 -0.063 0.033 
 (2.50) (0.48) (2.11) (4.20) (2.43) (4.14) (-1.43) (0.65) (-0.52) (-0.19) (-0.91) (1.57) 
Global financial cycle 0.036 0.099 -0.003 0.029 0.003 0.043 0.816*** -0.599 0.213* 0.242 0.453* -0.046 
 (0.72) (1.39) (-0.02) (1.09) (0.05) (1.46) (3.05) (-0.77) (1.90) (0.24) (1.68) (-0.29) 
Observations 37,951 15,929 3,728 142,574 34,030 112,274 2,682 230 5,392 428 2,196 3,624 
Under-identification test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.023 0.000 0.031 0.027 0.059 
Hansen J statistics 0.076 0.241 0.947 0.581 0.028 0.458 0.399 0.852 0.040 0.162 0.074 0.714 
Panel D: Dependent variable= Domestic debt/Total debt 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Policies = Macroprudential policy Sectoral openness Exchange rate regime 
Regional financial cycle*Policies -0.016*** 0.038*** 0.028*** 
 (-6.14) (7.29) (4.01) 
Regional financial cycle 0.034*** 0.159*** -0.004 
 (6.62) (10.52) (-0.64) 
Observations 133,375 141,542 145,500 
Under-identification test 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Hansen J statistics 0.941 0.141 0.766 
Notes: The table reports the results of instrumental variable (2SLS) regressions. Domestic debt/Total debt is the ratio of proceeds from domestic currency bank borrowings over total 
debt. FX debt/Total debt is the ratio of proceeds from foreign currency borrowings over total debt. Regional financial cycle is the common factor in bank flows to the countries in 
the region. All equations include firm fixed effects. All control variables are lagged by one time period. The remaining specifications, which are not reported for brevity, are identical 




Table A1: Correlation matrix 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 
1 1.00 
2 0.37 1.00 
3 0.42 0.48 1.00 
4 0.20 -0.20 -0.66 1.00 
5 0.31 0.71 0.28 -0.13 1.00 
6 -0.10 0.16 0.49 -0.42 -0.29 1.00 
7 
0.31 -0.04 -0.56 0.85 0.21 -0.74 1.00 
8 
0.12 0.47 0.83 -0.66 0.06 0.86 -0.77 1.00 
9 
0.41 0.81 0.66 -0.44 0.69 0.01 -0.19 0.46 1.00 
10 
0.52 0.40 0.80 -0.42 0.37 -0.05 -0.13 0.38 0.68 1.00 
11 
-0.11 0.02 0.62 -0.47 -0.21 0.86 -0.73 0.83 0.05 0.11 1.00 
12 
0.39 0.79 0.63 -0.47 0.66 -0.10 -0.15 0.39 0.97 0.72 -0.07 1.00 
13 0.51 0.38 0.78 -0.43 0.38 -0.11 -0.12 0.33 0.67 1.00 0.07 0.73 1.00 
14 
-0.07 0.07 0.63 -0.50 -0.21 0.91 -0.75 0.88 0.05 0.10 0.99 -0.06 0.06 1.00 
15 
0.33 0.00 0.13 0.19 -0.13 0.35 0.03 0.22 -0.23 0.06 0.19 -0.23 0.01 0.27 1.00 
16 
-0.13 -0.22 -0.76 0.75 -0.19 -0.08 0.46 -0.45 -0.59 -0.85 -0.22 -0.65 -0.86 -0.21 0.20 1.00 
17 
0.48 -0.12 -0.36 0.75 0.15 -0.76 0.92 -0.69 -0.11 0.12 -0.66 -0.05 0.13 -0.68 0.11 0.25 1.00 
18 
-0.03 -0.07 0.02 -0.03 -0.15 0.08 -0.08 0.05 -0.05 -0.02 0.08 -0.04 -0.02 0.08 -0.01 -0.01 -0.06 1.00 
19 
0.01 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.01 -0.00 0.01 -0.09 1.00 
20 
0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.05 -0.02 0.03 -0.02 0.02 0.00 -0.02 0.01 0.00 -0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 -0.00 -0.12 1.00 
21 
-0.02 0.00 -0.02 0.01 0.02 -0.02 0.02 -0.02 0.00 -0.00 -0.02 0.01 -0.00 -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.29 -0.07 0.00 1.00 
22 -0.05 0.45 0.25 -0.14 0.22 0.42 -0.15 0.39 0.24 0.19 0.15 0.21 0.13 0.23 0.41 -0.17 -0.22 -0.06 0.01 0.02 0.03 1.00 
23 0.36 0.66 0.67 -0.17 0.56 0.34 -0.12 0.59 0.67 0.56 0.40 0.56 0.51 0.41 0.28 -0.34 -0.05 -0.06 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.59 1.00 
24 -0.09 -0.27 -0.04 -0.08 -0.39 0.15 -0.28 0.13 0.01 -0.23 0.21 -0.05 -0.23 0.19 -0.23 0.06 -0.14 0.10 -0.02 -0.03 -0.01 -0.32 -0.10 1.00 
25 0.47 0.67 0.39 0.17 0.34 0.20 0.23 0.33 0.35 0.45 0.06 0.37 0.39 0.11 0.42 -0.11 0.20 -0.03 0.01 0.01 -0.00 0.51 0.63 -0.50 1.00 
26 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.03 0.02 -0.03 0.02 -0.00 0.00 0.02 -0.00 -0.00 0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 0.07 -0.17 0.10 0.14 -0.01 -0.01 0.02 -0.00 1.00 
27 -0.34 0.04 0.26 -0.23 -0.20 0.35 -0.38 0.40 0.02 0.10 0.46 0.06 0.09 0.45 0.22 -0.11 -0.28 0.06 -0.01 -0.02 0.03 0.26 0.23 0.14 0.02 0.02 1.00 
28 -0.44 0.08 0.38 -0.65 -0.27 0.34 -0.58 0.47 0.13 0.31 0.35 0.26 0.31 0.37 -0.13 -0.58 -0.52 0.10 -0.01 -0.04 -0.00 0.16 0.00 0.01 0.09 0.03 0.54 1.00 
29 0.09 -0.32 -0.16 -0.11 -0.29 -0.28 0.10 -0.27 -0.29 0.08 -0.42 -0.08 0.11 -0.34 0.13 -0.18 0.22 0.02 -0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.13 -0.56 -0.04 -0.19 -0.00 -0.09 0.22 1.00 
 
Notes: The table presents the correlation matrix between all explanatory variables: (1) Regional financial cycle; (2) Global financial cycle; (3) Regional interbank rate; (4) Regional 
yield spread; (5) Regional policy rate; (6) US interbank rate; (7) US yield spread; (8) US policy rate; (9) JP interbank rate; (10) AUS interbank rate; (11) SG interbank rate; (12) JP 
policy rate; (13) AUS policy rate; (14) SG policy rate; (15) JP yield spread; (16) AUS yield spread; (17) SG yield spread; (18) Size; (19) Liquidity; (20) Tangibility; (21) Export 
firm; (22) GDP growth; (23) Stock returns; (24) Interbank rate; (25) Macroprudential policy; (26) Sectoral openness; (27) Exchange rate regime; (28) US monetary policy uncertainty; 




Table A2: Impact of regional factors on regional financial cycle 
 (1) 
 Regional financial cycle 
  
Regional interbank rate -0.422** 
 (-2.26) 
Regional yield spread -0.064** 
 (-2.53) 








Notes: The table presents the results of a regression of the regional financial cycle on a series of regional factors, 
including regional interbank rate, regional yield spread and regional policy rate, and a constant. T-stats are reported 
below the coefficients. 
